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Building regional governance in England: The view from Whitehall 
Graham Pearce and Sarah Ayres 
Abstract: Constitutional arrangements in parts of the UK have been transformed by political 
devolution. In the English regions the Government has pursued a more cautious approach based 
upon reinforcing the regional tier through administrative decentralisation. Nonetheless, such 
reforms represent a significant strengthening of the machinery of regional governance and open up 
opportunities for the recalibration of intra-state relations. Drawing on the views of Whitehall civil 
servants, this article explores how central-regional relations are being adapted and how 
government is building a regional perspective into its activities. We conclude that the implications 
of increased regionalisation for government have not been fully grasped and that greater attention 
needs to be given to regional priorities in the development of national policies and the adoption of 
a more co-ordinated approach to regional strategy making and implementation.  
Keywords: Decentralisation, Devolution, Whitehall, English regions, Multi-level governance  
Introduction 
Given the weakness of local government and the stress placed on the efficient and equitable 
delivery of universal services, the UK has traditionally been viewed as a classic example of a 
unitary state in which central institutions dominate decision-making (Richards and Smith, 2002; 
Smith, 1999; John, 1996). However, in responding to growing evidence that the dispersion of 
government across territorial tiers is more effective than central state monopoly, the Labour 
Government has introduced constitutional reforms which have brought about an asymmetric set of 
territorial structures and processes (Marks and Hooghe, 2000; Jessop, 1999). Combining central 
control with decentralised decision-making at the regional tier in the UK is not a new phenomenon, 
it was practised for many years through separate government offices for Northern Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales, though their capacity to reflect territorial priorities in policy or spending decisions was 
confined. The recent devolution settlements in the Celtic nations and the creation of a strategic 
authority for London, therefore, signify a radical departure, not merely the decentralisation of 
central government functions but the exercise of territorial self governance and participation in 
policy making and implementation.  
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The English regions lack this legacy of territorial working and, rather than political devolution, the 
government has adopted a far less radical approach based upon administrative decentralisation. 
During Labour’s first term the Government’s Regional Offices (GOs) were bolstered to enable 
Whitehall departments to oversee the delivery of national policies at regional and local levels and 
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) appointed to prepare and deliver regional economic 
strategies. Unelected Regional Chambers were established in 1999 to provide a mantle of regional 
democracy, but without legislative or policy making powers. A thick, but fragmented, layer of Non 
Departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs) is also present (Ayres and Pearce, 2002; House of 
Commons, 2001; Skelcher, 2000). In 2002 the Government published its White Paper, Your 
Region, Your Choice: Revitalising the English Regions, which introduced proposals to further 
enhance the powers of GOs, RDAs and Assemblies (Cabinet Office and DTLR, 2002). It also 
endorsed the creation of Elected Regional Assemblies in those regions where there is evidence of 
public support, expressed in referendums. In November 2004, however, 78% of electors in the first 
referendum in the North East rejected this opportunity, forcing the government to abandon its plans 
for regional government. The implication is that, for the foreseeable future, reliance will be placed 
on reforms to the organisation of regional governance set out in Chapter 2 of the White Paper. 
These gave the GOs, RDAs and Assemblies additional responsibilities for regional decision-
making and the co-ordination of strategies and implementation frameworks, prepared by public 
sector stakeholders and their partners in the business and community sectors. In addition, the 
unelected assemblies will retain specific responsibilities for strategic spatial planning, housing and 
transport.  
These developments can be regarded as strengthening the machinery of regional governance and 
evidence of the Government’s continuing commitment to the reform of intra-state relations, in 
which decision-making and co-ordination competencies are no longer monopolised by Whitehall. 
In 2003 the Deputy Prime Minister declared “I’m proud that we have shifted the balance of power 
away from Westminster and Whitehall and changed the culture that ‘Whitehall always knows 
best’” (Prescott, 2003). The White Paper asserted that administrative decentralisation ‘will make 
the delivery of programmes and policies more efficient and ultimately lead to better outcomes in all 
regions’ (Cabinet Office and DTLR, 2002: 3.14). Decentralisation also brings about the possibility 
of greater territorial flexibility in policy-making and reflects the widespread belief that the 
successful implementation of public policy ‘is increasingly dependent upon a much wider array of 
public, private and voluntary organisations than would be included within the traditional 
governmental framework’ (Flinders, 2002: 52). ‘More than ever before, governments are dealing 
with other autonomous actors in order to realise their policy objectives’ (Klijn, 2002: 150). In the 
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UK this can be seen as a response to wide-ranging reforms including a ‘de-centring outwards’, 
through markets and quasi-market mechanisms to NDPBs and a ‘de-centring down’ - the 
decentralisation and devolution of authority to regions and localities (Pierre and Peters, 2000). 
Whitehall departments are increasingly expected to take account of the views of regional 
stakeholders and ‘the Government believes that when decisions are taken with an awareness of 
regional priorities, they are likely to be better decisions and can allow more appropriate policy 
responses to be designed’ (HM Treasury, 2004: 1.1). Indeed, the enhanced roles of the GOs and 
Assemblies can be interpreted as a way of achieving greater horizontal co-ordination between 
regional strategies and within regional networks and ensuring that territorial interests are more fully 
represented in Whitehall. In the same way that the Westminster model epitomised an era of 
‘government’, so Rhodes’s ‘differentiated polity model’ describes an era of ‘governance’, a new 
form of co-ordination mechanism in which central government is only one of many policy actors 
(Amin and Hausner, 1997; Rhodes, 1997).  
Not all commentators, however, are convinced by this ‘quantum leap’. Though acknowledging that 
government may be in a state of transition, they conclude that the centre may be extending rather 
than yielding its repertoire of control and influence by ‘developing new means through which to 
achieve co-ordination, steering and gate-keeping’ (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 106). The notion that 
the ‘state-centric and constitutional perspective has been almost replaced by an image of 
government in which institutions are largely irrelevant…is exaggerated at best and misleading at 
worst’ (Peters and Pierre, 2004: 75). Structural inequalities between government tiers enable 
Whitehall departments to regulate governance by retaining control over resources and key policy 
decisions, limiting the capacity of regional actors to co-ordinate their activities and shape national 
policies to the needs of their territories (Marsh et al, 2003). Evidence for this lies in the growing 
importance attached to regional and local delivery targets, agreed between the Treasury and 
delivery departments, and the creation of new co-ordinating units and task groups to administer 
national policies at sub-national level (Cabinet Office, 2002; Davies, 2002; Morgan, 2001; Bache, 
2000; Holliday, 2000; Rhodes 2000a). While espousing subsidiarity the government can be 
accused of adopting a fragmented approach in which Whitehall departments have pursued distinct 
and uncoordinated approaches to decentralisation.  
The objective of this article is to explore these contrasting accounts of the emerging relationship 
between Whitehall and the key regional institutions. In particular, it examines whether regions have 
merely become useful conduits for the delivery of central government policies and targets or 
whether they have emerged as venues for promoting a more holistic approach to strategy making. It 
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draws specifically on a series of semi-structured interviews with senior civil servants in each 
domestic Whitehall department, but is also informed by interviews with senior staff in the key 
regional institutions. Interviews were conducted between Autumn 2002 and Spring 2004. Staff 
from the Local and Regional Government Research Unit in the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister advised on the choice of Whitehall interviewees. All interviews were undertaken under 
Chatham House Rules to ensure anonymity.    
We begin by briefly examining the key institutions that comprise the regional system of 
governance. Second, the extent of the linkages between central government departments and these 
institutions is explored. Third, we investigate how far the strengthening of the regional tier is 
expressed in policy priorities that are embedded in national and regional strategies and the extent to 
which regional bodies have secured increased discretion over policy and the use of resources. 
Fourth, we assess responses within central government to demands to ‘join up’ those government 
policies that have a regional dimension. Finally, we reflect on evidence of Whitehall’s changing 
relationships with the English regions.  
Regional institutions  
It is increasingly acknowledged that policy-making and service delivery based around Whitehall 
departmental structures and boundaries are unable to respond to the complexity of crosscutting 
issues associated with regions and localities. The Cabinet Office report, Reaching Out observed, 
‘The tiers of central government that impact on the regional level are highly fragmented, not able to 
deal with cross-cutting issues well, and generally do not have sufficient influence over central 
policy design and implementation’ (Cabinet Office, 2000a: 1.13). The outcome was a twin track 
approach. First, to promote a more holistic approach to regional governance, more Whitehall 
departments were persuaded to establish a GO presence, which were given additional powers to co-
ordinate programme activities and discretion over how to achieve results. Second, Whitehall co-
ordination of those policy initiatives that have a specific regional dimension was to be strengthened 
and greater account taken of the strategic outcomes of central government initiatives affecting 
regions. The consequence has been growing interest in developing the vertical connections between 
national and sub-national tiers and the horizontal connections between policy areas. Vertical 
decentralisation has been applied to those policies with a strong territorial impact: economic 
development, employment, housing, rural, spatial planning, transport and the environment, which 
has prompted calls for greater strategy co-ordination at the regional level.  
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The eight Government Regional Offices have become Whitehall’s key representatives in the 
regions and are regarded as a crucial mechanism for policy co-ordination and delivery. Ten 
Whitehall departments now sponsor GO activities, compared with only three in 2001. GOs are 
expected to contribute to some forty ‘high level’ government targets, manage annual expenditure of 
some £9bn, tackle cross-cutting issues and help co-ordinate policy delivery. Each sponsor 
department contributes to administrative costs in direct proportion to their financial contribution. 
Significantly, however, each retains control over its programme funding. In addition a Regional 
Co-ordination Unit (RCU), based in the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), was 
established in 2001 as a ‘hub’ to support the GO network and facilitate a more corporate approach 
to regional issues across Whitehall.  
In 1998 the RDAs were created to assist in strengthening regional economic performance, achieve 
regionally balanced growth and tackle intra-regional economic inequalities. Accountable to the 
Secretary of State for the DTI, RDA’s have a £2bn annual budget comprising contributions from 
the ODPM (75% of funding) DTI, DfES, DEFRA and DCMS. In 2002, and again in 2004, RDAs 
were given additional resources and greater discretion over their use, together with new 
responsibilities for tourism and transport, the delivery of rural policies, skills and business support. 
These were matched by tough and tightly monitored sets of government imposed targets and 
milestones. RDAs are also to ensure that their strategies and activities fit in with the wider 
framework of regional strategies, notably Regional Planning Guidance (RPG) (DETR, 2002). 
RDAs can be regarded, therefore, as a step towards decentralising decision-making over economic 
policy, in which regions will have increasing freedom, flexibility and funding to exploit their 
indigenous sources of growth, but tied to stronger accountabilities and performance incentives (HM 
Treasury, DTI and ODPM, 2004). 
The 1997 White Paper, Building Partnerships for Prosperity, setting out the Government’s plans 
for RDAs, also proposed the creation of nominated Regional Chambers (DETR, 1997). While 
RDAs would be principally responsible to ministers, Chambers (subsequently renamed 
Assemblies), representing local authorities and regional economic and social interests, would act as 
a counterbalance to RDAs by making them regionally accountable for their activities (Snape et al, 
2003). Assemblies are also expected to provide a forum for regional representatives to engage with 
GOs and other regional government bodies, prepare regional spatial and housing strategies, co-
ordinate regional strategies and present an independent voice on behalf of their regions. 
Nonetheless, they have no statutory or real decision-making powers and rely on influence with 
other regional bodies to deliver their objectives. Compared with the elected bodies elsewhere in the 
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UK their joint resource base is also limited, less than £30m annually and, though in receipt of local 
authority subscriptions, are increasingly reliant upon closely supervised and contingent ODPM 
funding (Jeffery and Reilly, 2004).  
A measure of central government’s dominance is the extent of its control over public expenditure 
in the regions. A recent study in the West Midlands revealed that of the £22bn public expenditure 
identified during 2001-02, some 95% was provided directly or indirectly by central government. 
Social security and health accounted for almost half and local government for a further quarter. 
Local government is dependent, however, upon central government for some 75% of its 
expenditure and ministers influence many of the decisions about how those resources should be 
assigned (Ayres and Pearce, 2002). A significant proportion of expenditure - some £13.5b - was 
allocated through the ‘jig-saw’ of NDPBs and executive agencies, a layer of regional 
administration appointed by and directly accountable to ministers. This labyrinthine group of 
bodies has increased in number and influence, but the precise scale of their activities is uncertain, 
indeed ‘there is no formal map of the disposition of NDPBs …and quangos at sub-national and 
regional level throughout the UK’ (House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, 
2001). Following the Chapter 2 agenda efforts are being made to co-ordinate the activities of these 
bodies through the GOs. Nonetheless, because they are primarily concerned with means rather than 
policy aims, which are determined by their parent departments, NDPBs are ill-equipped to develop 
innovative approaches or align their activities to meet regional priorities.  
This brief examination suggests that though steps have been taken to boost regional institutional 
capacity, central government has been able to mobilise its extensive powers and resources to 
safeguard control. Developing relationships may have created superficial opportunities for ‘active 
subsidiarity’ at the regional level, but suggestions that they challenge the authority of the centre are 
unsafe. In effect we may be witnessing two familiar forces at work; the decentralising of limited 
decision making and responsibility for delivery, combined with measures to maintain control over 
key policy areas within Whitehall departments.  
Links between the ‘centre’ and regions 
Effective governance is more than about institutional design. It involves the management of 
process, the interactions and relationships between different actors in complex networks and 
relationships (Flinders, 2002; Kickert et al, 1997). Institutional reforms should be accompanied by 
mechanisms for communication and information exchange between the centre and key regional 
institutions. Our interviews confirmed that prior to 1997, beyond a small group of departments 
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concerned with urban regeneration, land use planning, economic development and culture, there 
was very limited awareness in Whitehall about the regional dimension. Indeed, it had taken some 
time for civil servants to determine what Labour’s agenda for decentralisation was about and how 
they should develop and participate in new or existing networks of relationships with the regions. 
Several triggers induced a change in perceptions. They included the growing stress placed upon 
region based public service targets. Second, the decision to increase the number of departments 
sponsoring GO activities to improve policy delivery, especially in areas which span departmental 
boundaries. Third, the growing emphasis placed by the Treasury on the need to tackle regional 
economic disparities (HM Treasury and DTI, 2001) and, fourth, an emerging recognition that some 
policy flexibility is required to take account of regional diversity. Finally, the publication of the 
English Regions White Paper, which opened up the prospect of greater accountability through 
political devolution, raised awareness of the regional tier across Whitehall  
The outcome is that most departments have established new or expanded existing teams to 
administer various aspects of the emerging regional agenda, including ensuring departmental 
interests are reflected in GO annual business plans, participating in RCU meetings and responding 
to regional submissions to the spending review process. The civil servants interviewed generally 
welcomed the opportunities to establish links with regional bodies and were alert to the regional 
dimension of work in their own and other departments. How far this awareness is embedded more 
generally in Whitehall is less certain and we were invariably advised that, despite ministerial 
rhetoric, traditional Whitehall working methods continued to squeeze out a regional perspective. 
Indeed, apart from negotiations around the White Paper, ‘decisions about the devolution of 
functions have been taken in the absence of any real template against which you can take consistent 
decisions at the centre’ (DEFRA official). Departments were following independent agendas and 
approaches to decentralisation appeared idiosyncratic, with some departments focussing on 
regional structures (ODPM, DTI, DCMS), while others (DoH, DfES) had largely bypassed the 
regional tier in favour of sub-regional or local bodies. The consequence, according to a DfES 
official, was ‘increased duplication of effort and confusion at the centre’, with ‘too many 
organisations vying for political position and influence over the policy process’.  
Most civil servants attributed their increased contacts with regional institutions to the growing 
responsibilities of the GOs. A DEFRA official observed that ‘the department is far more exposed to 
external networks and working relationships than under its predecessor MAFF’ which, until 2002, 
had resisted engagement in the GOs and, like the Home Office, was still adjusting to its new GO 
role. New, government inspired, regional and sub-regional strategies had also encouraged civil 
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servant to communicate with their regional colleagues to gather information and feedback on 
implementation issues. Whitehall civil servants viewed the expertise and personalities of key 
individuals in the regions as crucial, reflecting the view that effective governance is dependent 
upon ‘soft’ process measures, inter-personal relationships and trust (Rhodes, 2000b).  
‘There is a need to improve mutual understanding and open up organisational cultures between 
the Government Offices and the centre. There should be greater opportunity for people at the 
centre to spend time in the regions, and vice versa. Increased face-to-face contact when 
working on specific policy projects is vital’ (Cabinet Office and ODPM, 2002:30).  
Such contacts were seen as beneficial in transferring knowledge and expertise, though officials 
acknowledged that available staff resources limited engagement beyond the GOs. The transfer of 
resources to GOs was seen as a way of fostering speedier and more effective delivery and joined up 
working. Civil servants were mindful, however, that the GO’s primary duty is to deliver PSA 
targets and, given the system of ministerial accountability, dangers could arise in transferring too 
much discretion over policy-making and delivery, particularly where responsibility is shared across 
departments. It was even insinuated that the new pedigree of Regional Office Directors, many of 
whom are not career civil servants, had introduced a group of potentially more independent minded 
officials who might at some stage stand up for their region’s interests against a department or 
powerful NDPB.  
One of the more remarkable features of the new regional institutional landscape is the ‘RDAs 
absolutely unprecedented access to ministers among Quangos, including bilateral meetings 
between RDA chairs and the Prime Minister twice a year’ (Treasury official). Ministers and civil 
servants, apart from those in the Department of Health and the Home Office which liase with the 
Agencies through their GO teams, have regular monthly meetings with RDA senior staff. Treasury 
officials had clear political instructions to press the regional agenda and develop personal 
relationships with RDA board members and senior staff. Reflecting the importance attached to 
their role in promoting regional economic development a Treasury official observed, ‘RDAs attend 
our monthly meetings and key RDA personnel have access to our senior officials on a one-to-one 
basis. If they have a voice we certainly have an ear’. Some delivery departments had expressed 
unease about the increased flexibility given to RDAs, fearing they might pursue activities that 
would conflict with national policies. In this respect the Treasury, ODPM and the No 10 Office 
have played a pivotal role. An ODPM official observed, ‘there’s not an open door to Gordon 
Brown and John Prescott, but they provide very strong support [for RDAs] and I’ve seen the 
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Treasury in meetings overcome some of the obstacles and difficulties that departments were raising 
about RDA activities’.  
Groupings of local authorities played an important part in developing regional institutional 
arrangements during the 1990s and, in some regions, Chambers were established in advance of the 
government’s proposal to create unelected regional bodies. Regional Assemblies are formally 
regarded in Whitehall as the legitimate representatives of the regions and a key point of reference 
for the GOs. Whitehall civil servants were hard pressed, however, to identify any direct links 
between their departments and these nominated bodies and most were unaware of the White 
Paper’s proposals to enhance their strategy co-ordination role. ODPM ministers do have regular 
meetings with Assembly leaders and officials from the ODPM and the Department for Transport 
participate in the activities of the English Regions Network (ERN), the umbrella organisation for 
Assemblies established with ODPM support. In addition, civil servants from the ODPM and DfT 
have quarterly meetings with Assembly staff responsible for regional planning, transport and 
monitoring, which are seen as useful in exchanging information and providing feedback on the 
feasibility of government policy and guidance. In general, however, Assemblies were viewed as 
having limited capacity in terms of legitimacy, statutory powers, technical competence or influence. 
Furthermore, beyond the ODPM and DfT, civil servants’ awareness of the ERN was scant. Overall, 
civil servants were under few pressures to pursue any direct relationship with Assemblies, 
preferring to work through the GOs, RDAs or their own regional agencies. Their restricted funding, 
delivery powers and the difficulties faced by any new institution in establishing a record of 
achievement, confirmed that unelected Assemblies are not yet well placed to persuade ministers 
that they should be granted additional powers and resources.  
Regional influence over policies and spending plans 
Recent developments may have strengthened the role of key regional institutions, but the real test 
of their effectiveness is the extent to which they are able: 
 To develop regional policy priorities, which are embedded in national policy making, 
 To prepare coherent regional strategies, and  
 To secure increased discretion over the use of budgets.  
In this section we examine these three key dimensions from a Whitehall perspective.  
 11 
Developing and embedding regional priorities in national policy  
In 2001, the Government’s annual spending review was replaced by a three year spending horizon 
in which resources were to be allocated on the basis of bilateral Public Service Agreements 
between the Treasury and spending departments. Cross cutting targets were also encouraged, 
involving several departments and their agencies, for example the agreement between the Treasury, 
ODPM and DTI to jointly promote economic growth in all parts of the UK, and to narrow the gap 
in growth rates between the regions. The Chancellor also inserted a regional dimension into the 
spending review process by confirming that, 
‘Regional institutions, such as the RDAs and the Government Offices, were being asked to 
consider the key strategic priorities for their regions to bring about increased economic 
productivity. This analysis will feed into departmental allocations and geographical priorities 
emerging from the 2002 Spending Review’ (HM Treasury, 2001: 6.57).  
The aim of this ‘intelligence gathering exercise’ was not to invite bids for additional resources, but 
to inform decisions about how mainstream spending might be modified to improve their 
effectiveness, including cross cutting measures and targets. GOs and RDAs subsequently submitted 
Regional Priority Documents to the Treasury and individual departments were to reflect on how 
these might be addressed in their spending plans.  
‘I’m hoping the regional input will increase as time goes on and the process is refined. We 
are hoping to change people’s thoughts from how much they get to what they are able to 
deliver. We want to challenge people and ask them what will we get for this? Where good 
cases are being made they may get more funds’ (Treasury official).  
The Treasury’s message was unambiguous, but officials in spending departments were circumspect 
about the impact of regional inputs on departmental priorities. ‘They can influence in a modest 
way, they can make representation and they may or may not get listened to. They certainly can’t 
control Whitehall in any way’ (DoT official). A DfES civil servant was even more cautious,  
‘If you’re talking about the real world, they [GOs] have limited influence. In theory, they are 
supposed to have a lot of influence but, because of the way they work, because they’re 
unable to demonstrate their added value, they don’t have credibility in the system. Without 
that it’s very difficult to have influence.’ 
 12 
Alongside measures to sensitise programmes to regional priorities, in 2002 the Treasury requested 
all spending departments to identify expenditure on a regional basis. Funding transparency is 
regarded as essential in gauging how far resource allocations reflect territorial priorities. But, as 
McLean's recent work to identify EU and national flows of public expenditure on a regional basis 
reveals, the process is far from straightforward (McLean, 2003). A DTI official confirmed these 
difficulties and also drew attention to the potential political consequences.  
‘They [the Treasury] asked every department to describe the regional impact of its 
expenditure and we all found that terribly difficult. In DTI we’ve broken up areas of the 
department and looked at bits of this or that budget and where does it go in regional terms. 
The Treasury wants us to go further and get every department to track its expenditure in 
regional terms. That’s something we’re trying to build into our thinking but the Treasury is 
consciously or unconsciously unlocking a box that could be controversial.’  
Despite the difficulties of encouraging departments to adopt a regional perspective, the Treasury is 
continuing in its efforts to incorporate a regional dimension into Whitehall policy making. To 
inform the 2004 spending review process Regional Assemblies, GOs and RDAs were invited to 
prepare Regional Emphasis Documents (REDS) (HM Treasury, 2003). These were to indicate how 
existing government spending and intervention might be refocused, to increase their respective 
impacts against government objectives and targets for increasing regional productivity and growth 
and improving social and environmental sustainability. The Treasury anticipates that regional 
institutions will also assist departments as they plan how to implement their targets, which could 
provide for more flexibility and differentiation between regions and feed into local authority 
financial settlements (HM Treasury, 2004).  
Preparing regional strategies 
The regional tier has become a focus for measures to improve productivity, reduce economic 
disparities, promote sustainable forms of development, regenerate urban and rural areas and 
develop cultural and creative interests. (Cabinet Office and DTLR 2002; HM Treasury, 2002; HM 
Treasury, and DTI 2001). The consequence has been a range of regional strategies prepared by a 
variety of regional bodies. Through decentralisation, the Labour Government can be seen to be 
devising new tools for governance which should provide the regional tier with increased 
opportunities to formulate policies (6 et al, 2002). Central government retains control, however, 
over the scope and content of the key regional strategies. For example Regional Planning 
Guidance, and its constituent Transport and Waste Disposal Strategies, is prepared by Assemblies 
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but issued by the ODPM. Referring to the engagement of regional bodies in RPG, an ODPM 
official also drew a clear distinction between their participation in regional policy making and their 
capacity to influence spending plans. 
‘Local authorities, business and voluntary groups now have an opportunity that they have 
never had before [to influence plans]. But when it comes to spending priorities the Secretary 
of State has to consider first of all the overall budget and second national priorities. In that 
context what can be done to amend the plans to reflect regional priorities is limited.’ 
Similarly, Regional Economic Strategies and Frameworks for Employment and Skills Action are 
drawn up by RDAs, but subject to Whitehall approval. While central government can claim to have 
made regional policy making more inclusive, regional strategies remain securely anchored to 
national priorities. Furthermore, some regional strategies are viewed as more significant than 
others. 
‘Some of the strategies are very specific and have operational consequences, like the RES. 
The RDAs will publish priorities about where they will direct their investment and that has a 
real world impact. By contrast, a Regional Sustainability Development Framework doesn’t 
directly lead to any real world consequences. It succeeds, if at all, in the influence that it has 
on other people and organisations’ (DEFRA official).  
In general Whitehall officials agreed that regional institutions have adequate intellectual and 
research capacity to prepare regional strategies. Doubts were expressed, however, about their 
ability to co-ordinate and take them forward to implementation. Particular concerns were expressed 
about the technical competencies of the Assemblies, which were only granted government funding 
in 2001. RDAs were also treated with some suspicion in terms of their mix of capabilities and 
people to manage the complexity of regional economic agendas.  
‘The problem is that the RDA’s work isn’t about direct project delivery it’s about how you 
influence and work with people. There’s still doubt about whether they have the capacity and 
people to fulfil this role, leading some to question the quality of the Regional Economic 
Strategies’ (DTI official).  
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Officials in other departments also had reservations about the quality and contents of regional 
strategies. A DfES official was critical, ‘In terms of the skills strategies being prepared…from the 
first cut there is no added value, no innovatory ideas, no bottom up solutions, but we have hope.’  
Securing discretion over the use of budgets 
A key measure of the autonomy available to regional institutions is the discretion they have over 
the use of their budgets. Both the GOs and RDAs have exerted pressure on Whitehall departments 
to allow them to adapt funding regimes to meet regional priorities and so enhance the delivery of 
national policies. In April 2002 this achieved some success in the form of a ‘single pot’ of funding 
for RDAs, which brought together the separate budgets of the DTI, the (then) DETR and DfEE. 
The Agencies were granted some flexibility to vire resources between programmes, subject to them 
meeting ‘stretching outcome and output targets to ensure their activities deliver their strategic 
goals, matching flexibility with greater accountability’ (HM Treasury 2000: 3.67). The outcome 
was that host teams in sponsor departments came to better understand what RDAs were trying to 
achieve, both in terms of individual programmes and securing a more cohesive approach to 
performance management. Its immediate impact was to enable civil servants to agree to proposals 
that were unacceptable only a few months before.  
‘Comparing the RDA’s financial management and controls and discretion two years ago and 
now you will see dramatic change which had given rise to opportunities for innovation and 
pressures on the centre to meet regional priorities’ (RCU official).  
A DTI official drew attention, however, to the difficulties in ensuring that the new thinking 
permeated departments.  
‘It was amazing that they [departments] moved to the single pot so quickly. To move from 
tight monitoring to look at outcomes and worry less about how they’re achieved is a huge 
cultural change for departments. But the RDAs should remember that they have a customer 
in their parent departments and there are pressures from within this department to impose 
our very specific targets.’ 
The GOs are officially viewed as a single government resource at the regional level. Reaching Out 
envisaged a more holistic approach by integrating the regional activities of Whitehall departments 
through the GOs and giving the Offices more discretion on how to achieve results (Cabinet Office, 
2000a). Views about the impact of these reforms varied; a Treasury civil servant confirmed that 
‘the GOs are still feeding very much into their own sponsor departments - the funding streams are 
 15 
still very persuasive’. Conversely, an ODPM official emphasised the growing capacity of GOs to 
align spending on related programmes and achieve policy synergies.  
‘The GOs bring together at least half of Whitehall’s departments and are able to deliver 
programmes on the ground. That didn’t happen before. The barriers are breaking down quite 
substantially, if you look at how they work now compared to five years ago you’ll see that 
the silos have substantially been eroded.’  
Chapter 2 of the White Paper spelt out a new role for the GOs to chair Inter Agency Working 
Groups, comprising NDPBs, to examine ways of co-ordinating policies with a regional dimension. 
For the most part this was judged by civil servants as a GO initiative, rather than part of the 
Whitehall agenda and its impact was anticipated to be limited.  
‘A lot of policies are delivered through NDPBs and hopefully they are joining up with GOs. 
We are trying to nudge them in that direction but it’s not always straightforward. Sometimes 
they have their own institutional jealousies and territoriality’ (DEFRA official).   
Though apparently committed to giving greater weight to regional priorities there remain profound 
ambiguities in the Government’s approach. It is looking to the regions to improve the delivery of 
national targets and is encouraging regional institutions to generate regional solutions and apply 
greater discretion over policy implementation. In practice, however, the institutions have limited 
opportunities to turn regional strategy into delivery because of the restraints imposed by national 
targets and funding streams. The consequence is a ‘catch twenty-two’ in which Whitehall remains 
suspicious about decentralising further powers and resources to a tier that has yet to demonstrate its 
competencies.  
Joining up the regional agenda at the centre 
‘Joined up working’ has become a fashionable term to describe the co-ordination of activities 
across organisational boundaries. Real world problems often do not easily fit within the boundaries 
of individual government departments, but decentralising or delegating functions in pursuit of 
greater service efficiency and productivity cannot be effective in the absence of co-ordination 
between and within government tiers (Stoker, 1999). New Labour’s response to the challenges of 
co-ordination across Whitehall departments and between government tiers emerged following the 
publication of Reaching Out and Wiring It Up (Cabinet Office, 2000a, b). Both studies concluded 
that problems of policy co-ordination arose from the dominance of functional over territorial 
 16 
concerns and confused accountabilities within central government. At the regional level 
institutional structures had evolved incrementally and were hindering efforts to tackle a range of 
policy challenges. This critique spawned a spate of activity including the creation of the Regional 
Co-ordination Unit, which was to act as the interface between departments and the GOs and a 
conduit by which departments would be informed about how their policies were working in 
practice. It would also bring GOs and departments together in a simple and effective way, but ‘it 
will not replace existing networks where they work well’ (RCU, 2001:3.4). GOs were to become 
actively involved in developing those policies that have a significant regional dimension or where 
they could contribute through their knowledge of local delivery. 
Interviews with government officials revealed a distinct divide between those who regarded the 
RCU as useful in facilitating the development of delivery mechanisms with the GOs and those who 
judged that its added value, in terms of ‘joining up’, was limited. The former group viewed the 
Unit as a useful ‘shop front’ for the GOs by which responses to a range of policy documents could 
be fed back to the centre. The RCU was praised for encouraging the GOs to examine their activities 
in a more holistic way, rather than as a series of separate, departmental sponsored programmes. 
Some officials, however, were more cautious about the Unit’s value. 
‘I would say that the RCU has broadly encouraged more joined up working but there is a 
long way to go. In large parts of this department we are starting from a negligible base, but 
at least people are talking to each other now’ (DERFA official).  
The RCU was censured for not promoting itself and working to develop links and confidence in its 
capabilities with government departments. Some officials felt that it had very little to offer their 
departments in terms of assisting their relationship with the regions, preferring to rely upon 
established bilateral links with GOs. ‘The RCU is an important secretariat or resource management 
tool but that’s it’ (DTI official). The Unit’s effectiveness depends crucially on the support and 
commitment of ministers and senior civil servants and faces the inevitable problems associated 
with any cross-departmental unit attached to a specific department.  
Though officially committed to inter-departmental collaboration several civil servants described it 
as difficult and time consuming, a distraction or an additional burden. We were also advised that 
departmental targets were not always consistent, hindering joint working. Some officials 
questioned the added value of collaboration and were wary of investing resources in cross-
departmental issues with a regional dimension. Moreover, while welcoming the increased presence 
of departments in the GOs and the opportunities it afforded to promote increased flexibility in 
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approaches to cross-cutting issues, this was offset by anxieties that such measures might 
compromise departmental priorities and targets. The danger is that if civil servants are simply 
going through the motions of joining up, the prospects for co-ordination at the regional level are 
diminished and, though regional institutions may seek to apply cross cutting methods, they will be 
thwarted because Whitehall departments are unable to respond. ‘If people are having to give 
priority to the requirements of the centre, which may be at odds with the regional agenda then 
clearly they can’t join up whether they want to or not’ (DfT official). Such concerns underscore the 
difficulties in facilitating co-ordination at the regional level in the absence of more fundamental 
changes to government budgetary and accountability systems and lack of effective co-ordination 
within the Whitehall machine (Flinders, 2002). Many of the problems and issues diagnosed in 
Reaching Out and Wiring It Up are still clearly evident. As the Prime Minister recently observed, 
‘Too often government’s structures reflect vested interests and tradition. Departmentalism remains 
strong in Whitehall - usually too strong - and the allocation of ministerial portfolios sometimes 
unhelpfully reinforces these barriers’ (Blair, 2004).   
Coherence in the process of territorial development is also hampered by the tendency for decisions 
about policy and delivery at the regional level to be taken incrementally. Individual departments 
are seen to be pursuing decentralisation through new regional institutions and strategies without 
sufficiently examining how delivery might be achieved through existing structures. The overall 
impression is that Whitehall departments are ‘pumping up’ regional institutions to promote their 
own policy and delivery agendas. The Sustainable Communities Plan, for example, which has huge 
resource and spatial planning consequences, was published without proper inter-departmental 
working to determine its strategic implications and was accompanied by conflicting messages 
about how resources might be used (ODPM, 2003). Similarly, the recent Haskins Review of Rural 
Delivery also expressed concerns about the duplication and confusion of delivery roles at the 
regional level (Haskins, 2003). The Barker report on housing markets also observed that, despite 
the presence of Regional Planning Bodies, Regional Housing Boards and Regional Development 
Agencies, ‘no organisation has overall ownership of the regional housing market … Greater 
integration between the various regional strategies and the bodies that produce them would seem 
desirable’ (Barker, 2004: 2.16-2.17). The preferred solution, however, was not to build on the 
mutually supporting roles of the GOs and Assemblies to co-ordinate government policies in the 
regions and integrate regional strategies. Rather, an additional layer of administration was proposed 
in which Regional Planning Bodies and Housing Boards would be merged and new ‘independent’ 
Regional Planning Executives created to inform the provision of market housing and investment in 
social housing.  
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Conclusions 
This account of institutional developments in the English regions provides an interesting view from 
a Whitehall perspective. As such it may not be an entirely accurate interpretation, but it does reflect 
the judgements of senior civil servants whose role it is to manage the process of multi-level 
working. Viewed from Whitehall the regional institutional landscape in England has clearly 
become far more crowded since 1997 and, at first sight, regional institutions seem to have greater 
freedoms and autonomies and opportunities to influence national policy decisions. Alongside the 
ODPM, the Treasury has supported the enhancement of regional structures and spending 
departments have been drawn, some grudgingly, into the process of regional working. GOs, RDAs 
and Assemblies have been invited to participate in national spending reviews and government 
departments have been cajoled into examining regional priorities in the context of their spending 
programmes, expressing their expenditure on a regional basis and co-operating on policies which 
have a territorial dimension.  
Conversely, Labour’s term of office has seen central government reinforce its own presence and 
influence in the regions. The creation of the RCU can be judged as a measure of Whitehall’s desire 
to improve the delivery of its own policies in the regions. The funding flexibility granted to RDAs 
has attracted particular attention and is perceived in Whitehall as representing a significant 
administrative and cultural shift. Nonetheless, RDA discretion over the use of resources remains 
circumscribed by national targets and accountabilities. The GOs have also been granted additional 
funding and are charged with fostering policy co-ordination. Their resources remain tied, however, 
to Whitehall funding streams and the GO’s principle task is to meet programme targets set by 
sponsor departments. Despite the expectations set out in Chapter 2 of the English Regions White 
Paper, GOs are not yet perceived in Whitehall as having the tight coherence that makes for a strong 
co-ordination role. 
One of the more intriguing outcomes of recent reforms has been the Treasury’s invitation to 
regional bodies to participate in the spending review process. Government departments remain 
reluctant, however, to incorporate regional priorities into their policies. Regional institutions have 
also been encouraged to prepare a multiplicity of regional strategies and the GOs and Assemblies 
are expected to instil a more corporate approach to regional policy making and implementation. 
Strategies are prepared, however, firmly within the confines of national priorities, targets and 
funding regimes and some are subject to ministerial approval. Indeed, from a Whitehall 
perspective, granting regional institutions greater discretion over the content of strategies could 
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lead to contradictions in the way government funding and accountability chains work. While 
apparently pledged to subsidiarity, there is limited evidence that ministers have fully digested the 
consequences of increased regionalisation for the machinery of government. Indeed, a sceptic might 
view the proliferation of strategies as evidence of individual government departments vying to advance 
their own separate agendas, rather than a measured attempt to promote policy integration. The absence 
of elected regional government and fragmented interests within regions also frustrate the formulation of 
a clear and consistent regional view. In these circumstances Whitehall civil servants can readily 
disregard pressure from beneath to adjust policies to meet regional priorities.  
Those observers who perceive the process of regional decentralisation ushering in a more dispersed 
form of government can be comforted by evidence that dialogue between staff in Whitehall and 
regional institutions has intensified. This is crucial in communicating understanding of government 
policies, ensuring that Whitehall staff better understand regional circumstances and building trust. 
The level of engagement, however, varies between departments and regional institutions, 
depending on how long organisations have been in place, departmental approaches to 
decentralisation and the legacy of regional working. Many civil servants in most domestic spending 
departments have regular, direct communication with staff in the GOs and ministers and senior 
civil servants in the DTI, Treasury and ODPM, have frequent meetings with RDA board members 
and senior staff. By contrast, apart from the ODPM, contacts between ministers and civil servants 
with Assembly members and staff are infrequent, underlining the limited role of Assemblies. 
Fashion may dictate that central government’s bureaucratic silos have become ‘anachronistic’ 
(Ling, 2002: 624), to be replaced by models that emphasise partnerships, networks and trust. 
Compared, however, with the broad constitutional reforms introduced elsewhere in the UK it 
would be wrong to conclude that the drive towards a multi-level, networked form of governance in 
the English regions has yet supplanted the Westminster-Whitehall model. Civil servants may be 
more familiar with the potential benefits of co-ordination across policy areas and between 
government tiers, but accountability mechanisms discourage cross-departmental collaboration and 
territorial flexibility. Responsibilities for delivering services may now be shared with regional 
partners but, only when regional institutions are able to demonstrate ‘credibility’ and ‘value added’ 
will Whitehall acquiesce to the transfer of powers and resources. Bache (2000: 589) perceives the 
importance of policy convergence, ‘or, perhaps more accurately, the absence of policy conflict’ as 
a crucial factor in determining how far central government will allow policy networks and sub-
national organisations to run their own affairs. While decentralising responsibility for delivery 
Whitehall continues to hold the purse strings, retains for itself the power to define the policy 
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agenda and maintains control by seeking to join up the activities of multiple service deliverers at 
the centre (Pierre, 2000).  
The Government’s approach to English regionalism was reflected in the negotiations around the 
White Paper, which was the fruit of what was politically acceptable, rather than a radical and over-
arching vision of future inter-governmental relations. Effectively there was a meeting of minds 
between New Labour and Whitehall. Strong regional government would be counter-intuitive for 
both (Sanford, 2002). Further administrative decentralisation will only be endorsed in those policy 
areas the government considers a ‘safe bet’, where there will be the least challenge to the centre. As 
a civil servant observed, ‘the government has dipped its toe in the water of decentralisation very 
gradually and has been pleasantly surprised by the way it's worked’. Whitehall officials have so far 
been able to pursue their relationships with the regions on a piecemeal basis and, perhaps to their 
relief, the prospect of elected regional government has retreated. Nonetheless, opposition to 
political devolution should not be used as a justification for ministers and civil servants to ignore 
their responsibilities for applying a more effective form of government at the regional level. 
Indeed, they have a central role to play in improving the co-ordination of national policies with a 
regional dimension, aligning the delivery of policies administered by a plethora of region based, 
government bodies and taking account of regional priorities and diversity in the implementation of 
national and regional policies.  
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